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Abstract
This paper uses data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2005 to analyze intergenerational income mobility in Austria compared to other European Union members. 
Applying various methodological approaches, the data reveal substantial differences in intergenerational income 
persistence across European welfare regimes. The results show that income class rigidities are much less evident 
in Nordic countries compared to other European countries including Austria.
Keywords: Intergenerational Income Distribution, Intergenerational Mobility
Intergenerationelle Einkommensmobilität in Österreich im Kontext europäischer 
Wohlfahrtsregime
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel befasst sich mithilfe von Daten aus dem EU-SILC 2005 mit intergenerationeller (Einkom-
mens-)Mobilität in Österreich und ausgewählten Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union. Anhand einer 
ökonometrischen Untersuchung wird der Zusammenhang zwischen der finanziellen Situation der Elterngenera-
tion und dem Einkommen der Kindergeneration erörtert. Die Daten legen substantielle Unterschiede in Bezug 
auf intergenerationelle Persistenzen in verschiedenen Europäischen Wohlfahrtsregime offen und zeigen, dass 
vor allem in den nordeuropäischen Ländern eine ausgeprägtere Mobilität als in den kontinentaleuropäischen 
Vergleichsstaaten (inkl. Österreich) zu beobachten ist.
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1. Introduction
The transmission of economic and social charac-
teristics from parents to their descendants has recently 
been calling the attention of numerous articles. The 
parental influence on the living standard of their child-
ren can unfold through many channels, frequently 
mentioned are social, cultural, and institutional con-
ditions, genetic inheritability 1 or monetary benefits. 
Beyond question, there exists considerable interaction 
between all of these factors and the influence of one 
single channel may hardly be isolated. However, most 
articles concentrate on a single dimension like edu-
cational attainments or income levels for the sake of 
simplicity and feasibility of research.
The transfer of advantages or disadvantages from 
parents to their children has been discussed controver-
sially, whereas the OECD (2008: 204) states that “many 
OECD countries are rightly concerned about inter-
generational mobility - the extent of transmission of 
advantages or disadvantages across generations. When 
children ‘inherit’ a substantial degree of their economic 
status or other important social characteristics from 
their parents, this generates widespread perceptions 
of unfairness and lack of opportunity. Societies cha-
racterized by a high transmission of social and econo-
mic status from generation to generation are mostly 
perceived as unfair”. It is therefore of great interest 
to reveal the nature and extent of economic transfers 
across generations. The independence of income levels 
between two generations would support the view of 
equality of economic opportunities for everyone. How-
ever, the predetermination of the economic status by 
parental income would signal a loss of efficiency, since 
children from socially disadvantaged families have 
limited access to the market of so-called high potentials 
even though they might have specialized skills. Resour-
ces would therefore not be deployed adequately which 
called for social and political consequences.
This article concentrates on the monetary dimen-
sion of intergenerational transfers in Austria, therefore 
making the suitable denomination of the object of 
investigation the intergenerational transmission of 
income rather than social mobility. Based on data from 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), we are able to analyze interge-
1 The contribution of genetic factors is still rather 
unclear and very controversial. This ongoing debate is 
famously entitled ”Nature versus Nurture”.
nerational income mobility in Austria for the first time 
and embed the results in a European context. Although 
there have been a number of international studies on 
intergenerational mobility, empirical research with 
standardized data for the European Union is rare. 
With the exception of articles by Causa et al. (2009), 
Esping-Andersen/Wagner (2010) and Franzini/Raitano 
(2009), no cross-country comparison for the European 
Union with EU-SILC data exists to our knowledge, 
neither does a detailed analysis for Austria. The latter is 
the major motivation for this contribution.
The content of the paper is structured as follows. 
In section 2 we provide a short literature overview 
and explore particularly the studies on the European 
Union. Hereafter, we analyze the data used in this paper 
in section 3 and discuss some potential difficulties con-
cerning the interpretation of the information at hand. 
In section 4 we examine the common methods of mea-
surement of intergenerational mobility and present the 
results of the calculations in section 5. Finally, section 6 
concludes and presents some policy suggestions.
2. Theoretical framework and literature review
The standard theoretical model for the analysis of 
intergenerational mobility was developed by Becker/
Tomes (1979) and is based on the assumption of utility 
maximizing households. The current generation of a 
family chooses the optimal human (and non-human) 
capital investment for their children, however, the 
market rewards for inherited endowments also depend 
on luck. The family endowments that are transferred 
are partly non-financial and comprise genetic, cultural, 
or religious elements. Due to imperfect capital markets 
and consequently given restrictions for the access to 
financial means for poor families in order to invest 
into their children, offspring of wealthier families have 
a comparative advantage 2. Solon (2004: 5) modifies 
the Becker-Tomes model and derives several intuitive 
implications for the optimal human capital investment 
into children (under ceteris-paribus conditions). First, 
higher-income parents invest more in their offspring’s 
human capital; second, public investments in a child’s 
human capital may partly crowd out parental private 
investments; third, parental investments in their 
2 See Franzini/Raitano (2009, p.347), who mention 
resources like time and money, e.g. books, good food, and 
medical treatment, as well as social networks and better 
schools.
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provided a detailed list of 16 articles concerning inter-
generational income mobility based on the calculation 
of intergenerational income elasticities 4. Solon (2002) 
listed another 12 articles concerning intergenerational 
mobility in countries other than the United States. 
He referred to studies in Canada, Finland, Germany, 
Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden and the United King-
dom, which derive mobility measures between fathers 
and sons with elasticity values ranging from 0.11 
(Germany) to 0.57 (United Kingdom). These values 
imply that if the income of one father is 100% higher 
than the income of another father, the son of the aff-
luent father will on average earn 11 to 57% more than 
the son of the poorer father. Most of these elasticity 
coefficients were calculated by least square estimates 
of a log-linear regression with age controls for both 
generations. Zimmerman (1992) cited several studies 
for income elasticity in the United States that compute 
intergenerational elasticity coefficients between 0.15 
and 0.45. Zimmerman himself calculated a value of 0.4. 
However, Mazumder (2005) argues that due to persis-
tent transitory fluctuations these estimates have been 
biased down by approximately 30% and instead calcu-
lates a value of around 0.6 for the United States. These 
ambiguous and varying results show the importance of 
the data choice.
In most articles, Sweden serves as a role model for 
high mobility compared to other European countries. 
Österberg (2000) analyzed Swedish tax-data files to 
examine intergenerational transmissions of earnings 
status. The scholar used data from the Swedish Income 
Panel which consists of a representative 1% sample 
drawn from the register of the total population. The 
information on income was gathered in two different 
periods, each lasting three years (1978 to 1980 for 
parents and 1990 to 1992 for offspring). The analysis 
concentrated on regression results as well as on tran-
sition matrices with respect to gender and compared 
the results with the work of Björklund/Jäntti (1997). 
Österberg reported high intergenerational income 
mobility in Sweden compared to estimates from most 
other countries. The author derived correlation values 
4 Most empirical analyses are based on simple regres-
sion equations, denoted by lnYi,t =α+β·lnYi,s + εi,t
where lnYi,t is the logarithmic lifetime income of a 
descendant of family i. This is determined by the average 
income of his generation α, a noise term εi,t and the influence 
of the logarithmic income of the parents lnYi,s. The coeffici-
ent β measures the income elasticity between two generations 
(see Corak 2004, p. 10).
descendant’s human capital increase with their level 
of altruism; and fourth, parental investments increase 
with rising earnings returns to human capital invest-
ment.
Although investments in human capital may be 
a decisive factor for intergenerational mobility, this is 
not the whole story from our point of view. Vilfredo 
Pareto’s circulation of elites, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of the habitus, and Thorstein Veblen’s theory of the 
leisure class are important contributions to an inter-
disciplinary approach to intergenerational mobility. 
In this regard, another perspective focuses on the 
intergenerational aspect of inequality of opportunities 
rather than mere financial inequality: “Opportunity 
sets begin taking form in utero. Who one’s parents are, 
what country they live in, and how rich they are make 
a great deal of difference for a person’s opportunities. 
The opportunity to life itself turns out to depend on 
such pre-determined circumstances as the education 
and wealth of parents, whether their house has access 
to clean water and sanitation, and how close it is to 
medical treatment” (Ferreira/Walton 2006: 5).
Progressive public investments into human capi-
tal could be a driving force behind intergenerational 
mobility. The most common approach to take the 
influence of government policies on income inequa-
lity (i.e. redistribution) into consideration is the wel-
fare regime theory. According to Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 26), European countries may be clustered with 
regard to their welfare state institutions together with 
the degree of stratification and de-commodification 
of basic needs. In his classification, three main types 
of welfare regimes are identified: liberal states (Anglo 
Saxon countries), corporatist-conservative states (pri-
marily continental Europe), and social democratic 
states (Nordic countries) 3. Eventually, an additional 
welfare regime for Southern European countries was 
developed (cf. Ferrera 1996). Following the approach of 
Franzini/Raitano (2009), we will discuss intergenera-
tional mobility in Austria in the context of European 
welfare regimes.
While the current state of research on intergenera-
tional mobility for most European countries is rather 
scarce, there has been considerable research on an 
international scale. In the 1990s, Mulligan (1999: 187) 
3 Note, that as Esping-Andersen (1990: 28) points 
out, Scandinavia may be predominantly social democratic, 
but it is not free of crucial liberal elements. Neither are the 
other welfare regimes pure types.
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varying between 0.11 and 0.18, depending on different 
restrictions. A similar result was given by Jäntti et al. 
(2006) who calculated a intergenerational income cor-
relation of 0.14 for Sweden.
In the 21st century, studies on intergenerational 
income mobility gained in recognition. Recent contri-
butions have been provided by Vogel (2006), Schnitz-
lein (2008) and Schäfer/Schmidt (2009) for Germany, 
Kopczuk et al. (2010) for the United States, and OECD 
(2010) and Causa et al. (2009) for European OECD 
countries. Examples of earlier research are Atkinson 
(1981) and Dearden et al. (1997) for the United King-
dom as well as Corak/Heisz (1999) for the case of 
Canada. Extensive work on North America and Europe 
has been published in a volume edited by Corak (2004). 
Black/Devereux (2011) contributed the most recent 
literature survey on intergenerational income mobility 
and its causal mechanisms. Lately, the exploitation of 
EU-SILC data for intergenerational mobility issues 
put forth various articles. Esping-Andersen/Wagner 
(2010) take father-son EU-SILC data for five countries 
(Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain and France) and find 
substantially higher mobility in Nordic countries than 
in Italy and Spain in particular. The difference is mostly 
explained by a “bottom-up” process of equalization. 
The scholars show that the advantages associated with 
descending from well-off origins are persistent, howe-
ver, such advantages also exist in the two Nordic coun-
tries. Causa et al. (2009) provide comparable estimates 
of intergenerational wage and education persistence 
across 14 European OECD countries with EU-SILC 
data. Income persistence for sons is particularly strong 
in Southern European countries as well as in the United 
Kingdom, whereas Nordic countries show lower persis-
tence, which is also true for Austria. However, income 
persistence is measured as the percentage increase 
in wages of an offspring having a father with tertiary 
education relative to an offspring having a father with 
below-upper secondary education. Further, the results 
suggest nonlinear effects and a higher persistence in 
the tails and in particular at the top. Finally, Franzini/
Raitano (2009) exploit EU-SILC data and measure the 
effects of parental financial distress on the educational 
attainments and wages of the offspring. The scholars 
embed their results into a framework of welfare regi-
mes and reveal substantial differences with regard to 
regime clusters. Again, Nordic countries perform best 
concerning intergenerational mobility.
Aside from the analysis of linear effects in the inter-
generational transmission of income, another strand of 
literature deals with differences in elasticities across the 
income distribution of offspring. Since transmission 
mechanisms and policy conclusions may be entirely 
different for either tail of the distribution, it is necessary 
to analyze nonlinear trends in intergenerational mobi-
lity. The issue of nonlinearities in intergenerational 
earnings mobility was raised by Atkinson et al. (1983: 
114) thirty years ago: “The proportion of upwardly 
mobile sons from the bottom 20 percent appears to be 
considerably higher and the proportion of downwardly 
mobile sons from the top 20 percent appears to be 
lower.” Most of the earlier studies, which consider the 
issue of nonlinearity, have done so in order to test the 
conjecture of Becker/Tomes (1986) who imply a con-
cave relationship between the earnings of parents and 
their descendants. This assumption has been affirmed 
for instance by Eide/Showalter (1999). However, several 
scholars (e.g. Björklund/Jäntti 1997, Corak/ Heisz 1999, 
Bratsberg et al. 2007, Björklund et al. 2010) provided 
evidence for more convex patterns. Corak/Heisz (1999) 
carried out a significant empirical analysis with a very 
large data sample for Canada. They analyzed intergene-
rational income elasticities with a sample drawn from 
tax records of 400,000 father-son pairs. The scholars 
revealed evidence for high mobility in the middle of the 
distribution but low mobility in the tails.
Mazumder (2005) finds strong evidence that 
the richer half of his sample from the United States 
is more mobile than the poorer one. Although he is 
rather cautious with the interpretation of his results, 
he concludes that an obvious policy suggestion is the 
promotion of higher educational attainments among 
poorer households. Jäntti et al. (2006) examine tran-
sition matrices to estimate mobility by quintiles for the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Norway 
and Finland. They find that persistence is most pro-
nounced at the tails of the distribution whilst mobility 
in the middle three quintiles is fairly similar across all 
five countries. Persistence at the top is strong in all five 
countries, however, mobility in the lowest quintile is 
found to be much higher in Norway and Denmark. 
Interestingly, the much larger intergenerational elasti-
city coefficients in the US and the UK compared to the 
Nordic countries are almost entirely due to differences 
in the tails. For instance, contrary to the Nordic coun-
tries, the United States exhibit strong persistence at the 
bottom of the income distribution.
Hertz (2005) illustrates income mobility between 
diverse income groups in the United States. The over-
all intergenerational income correlation is rather high 
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(0.42), and the differences in the life trajectories of the 
children of the poor and the rich are substantial. In par-
ticular those at the tails of the income distribution, i.e. 
those stuck in either poverty or affluence, exhibit much 
stronger persistence. For example, a child born in the 
top decile has a 43.3 percent chance of staying in the 
top quintile. In contrast, an offspring from the poorest 
decile has only a 4.3 percent chance to end up in the 
top quintile 5. In a similar vein, Bowles/Gintis (2002) 
argued that the main explanation for strong persistence 
at the top is related to the fact that children of well-
off parents obtain more and higher quality schooling. 
Additionally, wealth inheritance makes an important 
contribution for the persistence at the top.
3. Data analysis and sample definition
For the moment, we briefly focus on methodo-
logical problems of data generation and then we turn 
towards technical issues of data acquisition. The most 
evident challenge concerning the measurement of 
intergenerational income mobility is the lack of appro-
priate data. The analysis of income spillover effects 
between two generations requires proper income mea-
sures of the parents and the offspring. To begin with the 
offspring generation, one major problem is the associa-
tion between current and lifetime earnings.
According to Wilkinson/Pickett (2010: 157), studies 
of intergenerational mobility require longitudinal data 
of as much as thirty years, “in order for the offspring to 
establish their position in the income hierarchy”. Since 
single observations of wages are more easily available 
than long-term data, the most decisive problem is 
the particular time of the data acquisition. According 
to Haider/Solon (2006), there are potential life–cycle 
biases caused by the arbitrary date of observation (cf. 
Zimmerman 1992:411; Schnitzlein 2008:12). It is not 
possible to reveal whether a descendant, aged 20, recei-
ves a low salary due to a low life–span income or due to 
little labor market experience. If the latter is true, asked 
15 years later, the person would almost certainly be at 
another position in the income distribution. Ideally, 
income data would be available over the entire working 
lives of parents and descendants respectively but such 
data hardly exists. However, the accessible short–term 
5 The predetermination at the lower tail is even 
larger. Children of the poorest decile have a 51.3 percent pro-
bability to remain in the lowest quintile, while those from the 
richest decile have only a 3.5 percent risk of ending up poor.
proxies for lifetime earnings could be influenced by 
transitory fluctuations. To minimize these distortions, 
Haider/Solon (2006) suggest reducing the data set to 
observations between the early thirties and the mid–
forties 6. We will take these considerations into account 
in our calculations.
With the methodological restrictions in mind, we 
employ the wage data from EU– SILC 2005. The survey 
is carried out in private households with a focus on 
income, employment, living, health and financial con-
ditions. The sample population consists of households 
with at least one household member aged 16 or older. 
There are several variables regarding an individual’s 
income collected in this survey (cf. European Parli-
ament 2003: 3). The reference period for the declara-
tion of all income components was the calendar year 
2004, the data was collected on an annual or (partly) 
on a monthly basis. If respondents could not or were 
not willing to reveal their exact wages, they were asked 
to point to a certain level on an income range chart 7. 
However, several values were missing in the raw data. 
Missing net income values were imputed in EU–SILC 
and missing gross income values were computed using 
net–gross–conversion.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the gross 
hourly wages of full–year employees. Self employed 
are excluded from the sample, due to well–known 
difficulties of properly reporting and measuring their 
income 8. Most respondents declared their working 
time per week, enabling us to calculate the annualized 
wages on an hourly level. These calculations are based 
on wages and salaries paid in cash for the time worked 
6 Couch/Dunn (1997: 220) show that potential down-
ward biases in the correlation between offspring and parental 
income may be reduced by raising the cutoff age to 25.
7 The gross monthly income was categorized into 
15 classes ranging from “1-600” to “8,001 and more” euros. 
For instance, 47 percent seized the possibility to declare their 
income out of investments (dividends, savings book, building 
loan contract, stocks and bonds, etc.) by the classification in 
categories. The alternative to such charts would probably be 
an increase in the rate of non–responses, resulting in a loss of 
important information on income.
8 According to Causa/Dantan/Johansson (2009: 10), 
the use of wages instead of all sorts of income “may potenti-
ally exaggerate the degree of intergenerational wage mobility, 
to the extent that the offspring of higher–educated families 
are less likely to be inactive than the offspring of low–educa-
ted families.” This argument is shared and extended by Fran-
zini/Raitano (2009: 365) who state that descendants with a 
wealthy parental background could more easily start working 
as self-employed.
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including holiday pay and any additional payments 
during the year preceding the interview. While other 
studies (e.g. Österberg 2000) lack data for working 
time, the EU–SILC is equipped with such data, and we 
are therefore able to correct for potential working time 
biases. Finally, we derive logarithmic hourly wages for 
2,795 individuals in the Austrian data who represent 1.8 
million inhabitants in the EU-SILC (See Table A.1).
Contrary to official data from tax or social security 
authorities, information on income in questionnaires 
cannot be verified. Statisticians have to assume that res-
pondents declare at least an approximation to their real 
incomes, which potentially could lead to distortions if 
the assumption is violated. Especially at both tails of the 
income distribution, there could be a tendency to over– 
or understate the incomes in survey data. However, we 
assume that these distortions are equally distributed in 
cross–country comparisons, since we do not suspect 
that the biases are systematically different by country. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in this 
paper are given in the appendix in Table A.2.
Concerning the measurement of parental ear-
nings, one obvious problem is the lack of data. Facing 
the scarcity of information, numerous scholars chose 
roundabout routes for the analysis of intergenerational 
mobility. Björklund/Jäntti (1997), for instance, estimate 
intergenerational income correlations for independent 
samples of fathers and sons, since income data for two 
related generations were not available in Sweden. The 
method based on predictions of the parental earnings 
given their education and occupational status (cf. 
Österberg 2000: 422). The same procedure was applied 
by Andrews/Leigh (2009) due to the lack of data. The 
authors estimate hourly wages via dummies for occup-
ation and age. The earnings of fathers in a certain occu-
pation are then believed to be the same as those of a 
40–year–old man in this profession. Schnitzlein (2008: 
7) approximates lifetime income via time series of 
annual observations in Germany. Problems and poten-
tial biases of such approximations are well-known and 
documented by Becker/Tomes (1986), Solon (1992) and 
Zimmerman (1992).
Due to the lack of data on wages for two related 
generations, the only practicable method to investigate 
intergenerational income mobility is the use of survey 
data that includes questions concerning the financial 
situation of a respondent’s parents. The EU–SILC pro-
vides such data in its 2005 questionnaire and again in 
the 2011 panel wave. One component of both waves was 
a module on intergenerational transmission of poverty 
that included several questions concerning socio–eco-
nomic characteristics of the respondents’ parents. The 
most favorable question for the analysis of intergenera-
tional income mobility was about the former financial 
situation of the parental household, which we will use 
as a proxy for parental income. Before we turn towards 
a critique of this variable, one has to emphasize the 
unique chance of analyzing data for two related gene-
rations: For the first time, we have such standardized 
information on more than one European country. 
However, comparisons between countries should be 
drawn carefully due to slight differences in the wording 
of the questions, the response items and the reference 
periods.
As is pointed out by Rojas Gonzalez (2010: 16), there 
were at least five different questions regarding the exact 
wording. The majority of countries asked for “financial 
problems” while two countries (AT, MT) requested the 
“financial situation” of the parental household. Conse-
quently, also the five response categories varied. Even 
though the variations are only marginal and some of 
these may be simply due to language differences or the 
translation process, phrases like “most of time”, “very 
often”, “always” etc. were synonymous for the same 
response item. Moreover, there were differences in the 
reference period of the respondents. Most countries 
used a reference period when the interviewee was a 
young teenager 9, between the age of 12 and 16. If the 
respondent hesitated or asked for a specific age, the age 
of 14 was used. This ambiguous definition of the refe-
rence period has produced differences in implementa-
tion across the member states.
Two characteristics of this variable have to be men-
tioned. First, the retrospective nature of the question 
and second, the possibility of reference–dependent 
answers. Retrospective questioning of descendants 
lacks accuracy in determining parental income, since 
the reference period in the questionnaire varies widely 
for different age groups. In general, parental income 
estimations that date back a long time are less valid than 
estimations for recent time periods (cf. Statistik Austria 
2007a: 59). As a consequence, the assessments of aged 
respondents may be less solid than those of younger 
9 A large number of member states chose the period 
of age 12 to 16 (CY, CZ, EE, FI, HU, IE, IS, IT, LU, LV, NO, SE, 
UK), some countries refer to the notion of young teenager 
(DK, EE, ES, FR, LT, UK). In two member states (AT, BE) the 
question refers to the age of 14. Further information and qua-
lity validation of the module are provided by Rojas Gonzalez 
(2010), EQUALSOC (2009: 14) and Statistik Austria (2007b).
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interviewees. Figure 1 shows that respondents older 
than 45 years tend to declare their parental household 
significantly more often in a bad or very bad financial 
situation than younger interviewees. One peculiarity 
in figure 1(a) is the trend towards the middle category 
in Austria which is not evident in our overall sample. 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficients between 
age and the parental financial status indicate a nega-
tive relationship between age and parental income 
status. This correlation is revealed to be more mani-
fest in Austria than in the total sample (Spearman’s 
rho of −.243 vs. −.122). However, this relationship 
could reflect the actual growth in wealth and living 
standard in Austria and the European countries in the 
last decades. Second, proxy information on income 
of third parties (i.e. family members) could underly 
substantial distortions. Even the self–assessment 
of the financial status entails difficulties which has 
been shown in recent studies 10. In the literature, one 
10 See BMASK (2012: 249): New data on the self–
assessment with regard to household wealth in Austria 
revealed that there is a trend that households see themselves 
as the ”middle class”. On average, a household from the top 
10% believes to be in the 6th decile. Especially the self–per-
ception of wealthy households is much below their real posi-
tion in the distribution.
problem of self–evaluation is referred to as reference–
dependent answers in surveys. Hence, even presumed 
that the respondents are aware of the financial capa-
bilities of their parents, a correct classification can 
not be taken for granted. Despite the limits of this 
variable, the fact that parental financial information is 
available on a European scale for the first time justifies 
the exploitation of the data for an intergenerational 
analysis of income. However, the interpretation of the 
results should be drawn carefully. 
4. The measurement of intergenerational income 
mobility
The common approach to assess intergeneratio-
nal income transitions are regressions of the parental 
income on the corresponding offspring income (cf. 
Fields/Ok 1996; Zimmerman 1992). We follow this 
traditional approach and formulate lnYi,t = α+ β1 ∙ lnYi,s + ϵi,t   (1)
where Yi,t are the (approximated lifetime) earnings 
of a descendant, Yi,s is the (lifetime) wage of the parents 
and ϵi is a white-noise error term. The coefficient β1 is 
commonly denoted as the intergenerational income 
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elasticity. Perfect income mobility between genera-
tions would be obtained with a value of zero, whereas 
a coefficient of one would report perfect immobility 11. 
Values close to unity are indicative of limited inter-
generational mobility, however zero intergenerational 
correlation is not necessarily the socially optimal level, 
as Black/Devereux (2011: 3f) point out. Offspring of 
wealthy parents may earn higher incomes due to the 
higher investments in education. Consequently, zero 
intergenerational correlation would neglect differen-
ces in returns to human capital investments.
We subdivide the analysis into two topics: a first 
equation should measure wage mobility; hereafter we 
will analyze more generally the influence of paren-
tal social status on wages. Since EU-SILC does not 
provide parental earnings Yi,s, we first introduce the 
parental income variable that has been discussed in 
chapter 3. The variable contains five response items 
that denote the financial situation of the parental 
household. We convert this attribute into five so-
called parental income dummies (PID), where 1 is the 
lowest income level and 5 captures the highest income 
level.
An adaption of equation (1) including the parental 
income dummies yields
ln Y = β
0
 + β
1
X + β
2
PID
2
 + β
3
PID
3
 + 
β
4
PID
4
 + β
5
PID
5
 + ϵ  (2)
where X consists of the sex and age of the respon-
dent and PID
1
 is the nummeraire. The coefficients β
2 
to 
β
5
 indicate a change in the logarithmic hourly wages 
given a certain parental income status, compared to the 
initial situation of a very bad financial level. The inter-
pretation therefore is always in relation to the worst 
11 An important constraint to this approach is given 
by Anderson/Leo (2009). The authors refer to the implicit 
assumption that y and x are homogeneously linear across 
all socioeconomic strata. If they were not, one could incor-
rectly interpret zero correlation as perfect mobility: “Imagine 
a deterministic world (perfectly immobile) where below a 
certain parental income there is an exact negative relation-
ship between parent and child outcomes, whereas above that 
income there is an exact positive relationship between parent 
and child outcomes; an appropriately balanced sample would 
yield 0 correlation with an inferred perfect mobility for what 
is a completely deterministic and immobile state.” (Ander-
son/Leo 2009: 621)
financial situation and consequently the coefficients are 
expected to be positive.
In a second step, equation (2) is enhanced by 
socio-economic characteristics of parents that could 
determine the wage level of the offspring as well, 
i.e. parental education and occupation. The subject 
matter changes from intergenerational wage mobility 
to the influence of the social status of parents on the 
wages of their offspring. Including the parental cha-
racteristics matrix P, the equation writes
ln Y = β
0
 + β
1
X + β
2
PID
2
 + β
3
PID
3
 + 
β
4
PID
4
 + β
5
PID
5
+β
6
P + ϵ        (3)
Although ordinary least squares (OLS) estima-
tions are the common approach to assess intergene-
rational mobility, some restrictions are mentioned 
in the literature. In chapter 3, the possibility of an 
income bias caused by the difference of actual and 
lifetime incomes of descendants has already been 
discussed.
Another caution is given by Corak (2004: 11), who 
emphasizes the difference between income elasticity 
and income advantage when the earnings distribution 
for the parental generation is very unequal. Corak 
argues that even small elasticity coefficients may 
indicate substantial income advantages for children, 
depending on the degree of inequality in the parental 
earnings distribution. Björklund/Jäntti (2009: 497) 
give weight to this issue as well. They point out that 
the OLS coefficient depends on income dispersion in 
two generations. Thus, if income inequality rises from 
one generation to another, a larger coefficient will be 
needed to account for the increased income variation 
in the second generation 12. However, all of the men-
tioned critiques would lead to an underestimation 
of intergenerational persistence, hence the results of 
12 The properties of the intergenerational correla-
tion are also mentioned by Black/Devereux (2011: 6). Con-
sequently, an elasticity coefficient multiplied by the ratio of 
the standard deviations of parental and descendant income 
should be preferred:
φ = β(σf⁄σs)
This correlation coefficient provides information about how 
many standard deviations the offspring’s wage would change 
by a modification in the standard deviation of the parental 
income. Since we are not in possession of metric variables 
for the wage of both generations, we have to abandon this 
approach.
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OLS estimations should be considered as rather con-
servative 13.
As mentioned above, a growing number of artic-
les on intergenerational transmission of income have 
recently shown evidence of nonlinear effects along the 
earnings distribution of the offspring. To obtain a more 
detailed picture of intergenerational wage mobility, 
we therefore calculate income elasticities conditional 
to the descendants income distribution. The common 
approach is to derive quantile regressions at different 
percentiles of the distribution (cf. Koenker/Hallock 
2001; Koenker 2010). The elasticity values at arbitrary 
percentiles θ can be derived by
where Yi,t is the offspring wage, Xi,t is the vector of 
explanatory characteristics and β is the vector of esti-
13 Nevertheless, according to O’Neill/Sweetman/
Van de Gaer (2007: 160), there could also be a counteractive 
upward-bias of the OLS coefficients due to omitted variable 
bias: “Omitted variable bias [...] occurs when unobserved 
characteristics that are inherited from parents, such as ability, 
are also correlated with earnings. The OLS estimator mista-
kenly attributes the variation in earnings due to inherited 
endowments directly to parental earnings, leading us to ove-
restimate the causal effect of parental earnings on children’s 
earnings. While the simple linear regression model provides a 
useful summary of the conditional mean function, it is only a 
partial description of the joint distribution of earnings. When 
considering intergenerational mobility patterns throughout 
the distribution, researchers have traditionally moved away 
from regression based models and relied instead upon transi-
tion matrices.”
mated coefficients including intergenerational income 
mobility. Using the methodic framework of quantile 
regressions should reveal nonlinear characteristics of 
intergenerational transmissions of income.
5. Key findings with EU-SILC data
A first intuition of intergenerational mobility 
is given by descriptive statistics. Figure 2 shows the 
(weighted) mean hourly gross wages for Austria by sex 
and age, given the particular parental income status 
from very bad to very good. The mean wage is clearly 
increasing with the financial situation of the parental 
household. The only counter–intuitive bar is the ave-
rage wage for young descendants of very bad financial 
family conditions. However, Figure 1(a) reveals that 
the number of observations is infinitesimal, in fact 
only three individuals are found in this category. With 
this exception, the increasing trend is true for both, 
age and sex. Remarkably, the income gaps between 
men and women as well as between young and old res-
pondents at both tails of the distribution vary signifi-
cantly. Thus, the first impression of the data shows that 
there is obviously a relationship between the financial 
situation of parents and the actual income for women 
and men of all age groups. 
In Figure 3(a) the Spearman rank correlation coef-
ficients for actual (logarithmic) income of descendants 
and the parental income status are illustrated. All 
values are significant at a 5%-level and, again, imply 
a positive relationship between economic family 
background and wages of children. The Northern 
European countries display the smallest intergenera-
tional income correlation which is in accordance with 
(4)
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Figure 2: Mean Wage with Respect to Parental Income Class in Austria for Sex and Age
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the results of an OECD (2010: 185) study. The OECD 
sums up various studies on intergenerational income 
mobility and shows substantially stronger links bet-
ween individual and parental earnings in the United 
Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain than in Denmark or 
Norway. Our results support the OECD conclusions 
with the remark that intergenerational income mobi-
lity is remarkably lower in Spain than in Italy or France 
based on our calculations. 
As mentioned above, most articles on intergene-
rational mobility identify education as a key driver of 
persistence in wages. According to the OECD (2010: 
187), the influence of the socio-economic family back-
ground on the educational attainments and wages of 
descendants reflects social norms or work ethics trans-
mitted to offspring and highlights the role of social 
networks. Austria is among those countries for which 
the OECD attests a large impact of the family back-
ground on students’ performance measured by PISA 
student test scores. In Figure 3(b), we examine the 
relationship between the financial situation of parents 
and the offspring’s educational attainment. Again, the 
Nordic countries show significantly lower correlation 
coefficients than all other countries. Southern Euro-
pean countries, however, exhibit the strongest links 
between the financial family background and educa-
tional attainments. In the European context, Austria 
and France show very similar results regarding the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients.
If these results are embedded into the welfare 
regime theory of Esping-Andersen (1990), we may 
draw the following picture. Countries that are cha-
racterized as the social-democratic welfare regime 
(i.e. Nordic countries) show the weakest relationship 
between parental financial status and offspring edu-
cational attainments or wages. The strongest evidence 
of intergenerational persistence is found in Southern 
European countries. The liberal (UK, IE) and the 
corporatist-conservative welfare regimes (AT, FR) 
appear to be very similar with regard to intergenera-
tional income mobility. However, we find a weaker 
link between parental financial status and offspring 
education in the United Kingdom, yet not as weak as 
in the social-democratic welfare regime. In the next 
step, the implementation of an econometric approach 
should reveal these relationships in a more detailed 
way, especially due to the possibility to control for 
other influences.
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We calculate the OLS model described in chapter 
4 for the welfare regime clusters as well as for each 
single country. First, the results of the wage mobility 
concept as formulated in equation (2) are illustrated in 
Table 1 and Appendix A.3. The inclusion of the parental 
income dummies (PID) is backed up by an F-test of 
significance. The null hypothesis H
0
 : β
2
 = β
3
 = β
4
 = β
5
 
= 0 for equation (2) may be rejected on all reasonable 
significance levels, thus indicating the influence of at 
least one dummy variable in the model to be conclusive.
The results of Table 1, where we now control for 
age and sex, draw a similar picture like the Spearman 
correlation coefficients. Again, the Nordic countries 
exhibit the lowest coefficients for the parental income 
dummies indicating the highest income mobility in 
the social-democratic welfare regime. If the Nordic 
countries are analyzed separately, most of the parental 
income dummies are insignificant (Appendix A.3). A 
significant, though comparatively small, influence of 
the financial situation of parents is only found for Swe-
dish individuals with a very good financial family back-
ground. The coefficients for the other welfare regimes 
in Table 1 vary conditional on the parental finances. 
The effects resulting from the highest PID are similar 
for the corporatist-conservative welfare regime and 
the Southern European countries, whereas the liberal 
welfare regime shows a little lower estimates. On a dis-
aggregated level, however, France exhibits considerable 
lower coefficients than Austria. Austria displays the 
highest coefficients of all countries in this analysis and 
features even lower intergenerational wage mobility 
than the Southern European countries. 
Since the effect of a certain parental income 
dummy on the logarithmic hourly wages of descendants 
cannot be isolated in OLS regressions, the exact effects 
on predicted wages are derived in Table 2. The exact 
percentage difference for the predicted values can be 
measured 14 by 
exp(βi)-  1       ∀ i ∈ {2,…,5}
14 We may calculate the influence of the ranks in the 
parental income distribution on their offspring’ earnings as 
a percentage, since the dependent variable is logarithmic. 
Omitting the parental income dummies and simply regres-
sing on β0+β1 X would yield an income of eβ0+β1 X. Introducing 
the first of the dummy variables would lead to an income of 
eβ0+β1 X+β2. β0  captures the effects where the financial situation 
of the parental household was very bad, however, we are inte-
rested in the effects on a child from a better-off family back-
ground. Hence, the percentage difference can be shown to be
Consequently, the percentage influence of all dummies 
based on the original Equation (2) can be measured byeβi - 1   ∀ i ∈{2,…,5}
Table 1: Regression Results for welfare regime clusters
(1) Continental (2) Nordic (3) Southern (4) Anglo-Saxon
Age 0.010***  
(0.001)
0.008*** 
(0.001)
0.012*** 
(0.000)
-0,002*  
(0.001)
Female -0.133***  
(0.012) 
-0.190*** 
(0.019)
-0.115*** 
(0.009)
-0.180***  
(0.023)
PID2 0.025  
(0.031) 
0.025  
(0.058)
0.099*** 
(0.015)
-0.007  
(0.053)
PID3 0.124***  
(0.030) 
0.063  
(0.051)
0.156*** 
(0.014)
0.090**  
(0.045)
PID4 0.146***  
(0.029) 
0.130*** 
(0.048)
0.154*** 
(0.016)
0.067  
(0.047)
PID5 0.181***  
(0.029) 
0.120*** 
(0.047)
0.162*** 
(0.015)
0.155***  
(0.043)
Constant 2.025***  
(0.038)
2.364*** 
(0.063)
1.663*** 
(0.024)
2.783*** 
(0.068)
Observations 8,153 4,137 19,125 3,750
R2 0.062 0.054 0.083 0.037
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations, weighted results.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The table shows the income effects of a movement 
in the parental income situation based on the initial 
situation to have a very bad financial background. 
We employ the term of “parental status movement” 
to express the effect on wages of descendants, if their 
parents are located in any financial situation but the 
worst one. Most of the numbers, with exception of 
those for the UK, show the expected evolution from 
small contributions by small parental status movements 
(i.e. the difference between bad and very bad financial 
background) to large contributions by large parental 
status movements. The results show that - controlled 
for age and sex - the income advantage for Austrian 
children with a very good financial family background 
is more than 40 percent compared to a counterpart with 
very bad financial conditions. While there seems to be 
only little influence of the parental financial situation 
in Nordic countries, the income gap in the Southern 
European countries is considerable. 
The picture drawn in Table 2 is consistent with the 
descriptive approach. The high values for the intergene-
rational income transmissions indicate low mobility in 
Austria, Spain and Italy. In contrast, the coefficients are 
predominantly insignificant in countries of the social-
democratic welfare regime and imply higher interge-
nerational mobility in Sweden and Norway. Again, the 
results for the United Kingdom are ambiguous. The 
regression detects no significant differences in wages, if 
the parental financial situation was good compared to 
very bad. However, a very good financial background 
leads to a substantial income advantage.
The OLS regressions have examined the average 
effects of the parental financial situation on the wage 
of descendants. However, we assume that the effects of 
the financial family background may have a nonlinear 
impact across the earnings distribution of offspring. 
Therefore, we consider a quantile regression approach 
described in equation (4). To keep enough observa-
tions for each of the selected quantiles, we analyze the 
effects for combined parental financial situations “bad” 
(i.e. PID1 and PID2) and “good” (i.e. PID4 and PID5). 
Table 3 shows the percentage effects of a parental status 
movement from bad to good on offspring wages condi-
tional to their position in the earnings distribution. In 
most of the countries, the coefficients are considerably 
higher at the upper than at the lower tail of the distribu-
tion. Even in Sweden a comparatively small nonlinear 
effect is evident, whereas the coefficients for Norway 
are insignificant once more. All in all, the transmission 
of income advantages by well-off parents seem to be 
higher for descendants in the high wage segment.
We have shown significant differences regarding 
the effects of parental financial situation on the wages 
of descendants for European welfare regimes as well 
as for single countries so far. For the Austrian sample, 
we extend equation (2) first with additional parental 
characteristics (i.e. equation 3) and finally with further 
individual properties of the offspring generation. Equa-
tion (3) does not deal with income mobility, since the 
introduction of the educational attainments and skill 
levels of parents 15 could rather be defined as parental 
social status. The results for both concepts are given in 
Appendix A.4, subdivided for the age group proposed 
by Haider/Solon (2006). In the constrained sample, 
obviously the significance of age is diminishing, which 
is consistent with the assumption that the returns to 
seniority decrease within this age group. By contrast, 
the gender specific wage gap is considerable in all 
estimations. Even when controlling for differences in 
15 A graduation in secondary school is synonymous 
for ISCED-97 levels 3 and 4, a university degree refers to 
ISCED-97 levels 5 and 6. The availability of information on 
the occupation of parents allows us to construct a social class 
position. According to EQUALSOC (2009: 7), the 2-digit 
ISCO-88 codes can be transformed into four categories of 
social classes (ISCO-88 codes in parenthesis): elementary 
occupation (91 to 93), skilled manual (61 to 83), lower skilled 
non-manual (41 to 52) and highly skilled non-manual (11 to 
34). We include the non-manual occupation dummies into 
our regression to compare between blue-collar and white-col-
lar family backgrounds. Since there are some missing values 
for the parental variables, the Austrian sample decreases from 
2,795 to 2,556 observations.
Austria Spain France Ireland Italy Norway Sweden UK
1 → 2 0.071 0.067*** 0.014 -0.123* 0.092*** 0.005 0.008 -0.002
1 → 3 0.130** 0.115*** 0.125*** -0.026 0.207*** 0.016 0.004 0.101**
1 → 4 0.285*** 0.161*** 0.126*** 0.081 0.256*** 0.049 0.077 0.062
1 → 5 0.439*** 0.284*** 0.198*** 0.123* 0.323*** 0.066 0.088* 0.166***
Table 2: Income effects by parental status movement
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations. Coefficients are based on frequency weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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working time, educational attainments and occupa-
tion there remains a gap of roughly 20%.
The effects of a privileged parental financial 
status (PID4 or PID5) are large and significant in the 
wage concept as well as in the social status concept. 
In fact, a very good financial family background has 
the largest positive effect on offspring wages in both 
concepts for both samples. Moreover, the educational 
attainments and skills of parents can explain part of 
the variability in the social status concept. Unsurpri-
singly, occupation and education of parents correlate 
and each shows significant and large effects if let alone, 
however, we decided to show results for both included. 
In the extension of equation (3), we introduce several 
characteristics for the offspring generation. We include 
educational attainments, skill levels and management 
positions into the calculations to control for these fac-
tors and increase the explanatory power of the model. 
Since there are reasonable arguments that several vari-
ables in use could correlate with the parental income 
status, we check for problems of multicollinearity. The 
relatively low coefficients in Figure 3(b) show no suspi-
cion of severe multicollinearity, neither did additional 
pairwise correlation analyses. Moreover, we could not 
find any grave effects of multicollinearity by calcula-
ting the variance inflation factors (VIF). To a great 
extent, the variability in wages can now be explained 
by the characteristics of the descendants. The parental 
variables mostly turn insignificant with exception of 
a very good financial background which is large and 
significant in both samples. Hence, the educational 
attainments and the occupation, which both may be 
influenced by the financial, social and cultural back-
ground of the parental household, are decisive vehicles 
of intergenerational persistence. However, even if we 
control for the educational attainments, skill levels, 
and manager positions of children, which all emerge 
to have a large impact on wages, the financial situation 
of parents still makes a difference in Austria.
6. Concluding remarks
This contribution tried to shed light on the inter-
generational income mobility in Austria. Embedding 
the analysis into a framework of European welfare 
regimes should ensure the comparability of the results. 
Existing literature reveals that intergenerational ear-
nings mobility varies significantly across countries, 
with Nordic countries showing higher mobility than 
for instance Southern European countries. Moreo-
ver, some scholars emphasize the nonlinear effects of 
intergenerational transmissions of income advantages 
along the earnings distribution. The often mentioned 
factors causing intergenerational income persistence 
range from genetic, cultural and social conditions to 
institutional settings which are hardly assessable in an 
economic analysis. Most important, higher educational 
attainments via private or public investments are seen 
as major contributor to increase mobility and dismantle 
intergenerational persistence. With data from EU-SILC 
2005, we can confirm several assumptions postulated 
by the literature.
We calculated several indicators for intergenerati-
onal income (im)mobility whereof no single measure 
can provide a comprehensive picture. However, there 
are some cross-country patterns that are remarkable. 
In all calculations the Nordic countries (Sweden and 
Norway) showed substantially less intergenerational 
persistence than the other welfare regimes. Austria and 
the Southern European countries (Spain and Italy) dis-
played the highest transmissions of income advantages 
in all of the measures. The OECD (2010) mentions that 
Southern European countries appear to be relatively 
immobile whereas Nordic countries tend to be more 
mobile. In this regard our results are similar to those 
of the OECD. The main findings of our research can be 
summarized as follows: 
Austria Spain France Ireland Italy Norway Sweden UK
q10 0.103*** 0.145*** 0.100*** 0.077** 0.133*** 0.036 0.057 0.020
q25 0.141*** 0.179*** 0.095*** 0.163*** 0.118*** 0.050 0.063 0.115***
q50 0.180*** 0.228*** 0.127*** 0.218*** 0.131*** 0.025 0.067*** 0.165***
q75 0.239*** 0.304*** 0.154*** 0.188*** 0.173*** 0.049* 0.087*** 0.197***
q90 0.226*** 0.274*** 0.192*** 0.209*** 0.215*** 0.066 0.095 0.147*
Table 3: Quantile regression results for good parental financial status
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations. Coefficients are based on frequency weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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•	 There is a considerable relationship between the 
financial situation of the parents and the actual wages 
of descendants in Austria.
•	 The effects of the financial family background 
vary across European countries and the welfare regime 
clusters. Austria is among the countries with very large 
intergenerational transmissions of income advantages. 
Nordic countries, by contrast, exhibit a greater extent 
of mobility.
•	 The effects of intergenerational income persis-
tence are mostly nonlinear, except for Nordic countries. 
Particularly the upper tail of the offspring earnings dis-
tribution shows a higher significance of the parental 
financial situation in wage determination.
•	 The relevance of the financial background 
decreases, if educational attainments and occupation 
of parents are taken into consideration. Obviously, 
education and occupation (which may be identified 
with social status) are important channels for the inter-
generational transmission of income advantages in 
Austria.
•	 Even when controlling for several socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the offspring generation, 
which can explain a large part of the variability in 
wages, the financial situation of the parental household 
still matters in Austria.
The results show that there exists an intergenera-
tional income relationship but they cannot reveal the 
exact channels through which it unfolds. Franzini/Rai-
tano (2009: 355) enumerate four channels for the impact 
of parental finances on the wages of their descendants. 
First, well-off students have access to better educational 
institutions which will increase their future earnings. 
Second, the financial background has an impact on 
the living standard, health status, individual behavior, 
relational capital, and social networks. This could be 
subsumed with the term of cultural capital developed 
by Bourdieu (1987). Third, poorer individuals tend to 
be satisfied with the first job they find because they 
cannot afford to wait for the one with the best long-
term prospects. Fourth, social networks are mostly 
accessible only to well-off individuals, whereas persons 
from a poor financial background lack informal relati-
onships for finding a good job. Regarding these various 
channels, the OECD (2010: 194) states that policies for 
higher social mobility should be accompanied by poli-
cies for more equal societies. Therefore, progressive tax 
systems and social transfer programs should not only 
help to make a society more equal but also strengthen 
the chances for individual social and economic advan-
cement. Apparently, social-democratic welfare regimes 
could serve as a model worth studying in this respect.
Finally, the relevance of educational attainments 
has to be singled out. The individual positioning in 
social systems seems to result to a large extent from 
parenting and schooling in the very beginning years. 
In its 2006 report on “Efficiency and Equity in Euro-
pean education and training systems” the EU Com-
mission stated the following: “Pre-primary education 
has the highest returns in terms of the social adapta-
tion of children. Member States should invest more in 
pre-primary education as an effective means to esta-
Parents’ Abilities
Parents’ Education
Familiy Income
Heredity
Quality of Time Inputs
Quantity of Time Inputs
Quality of Good Inputs
Quantity of Good Inputs
Home Investments
Ability
Final Schooling Level
Post-school investment
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Early childhood investment
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Source: Haveman/Wolfe 1995, p.1833, with own amendments
Figure 4: The Determinants of Children’s Attainments
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blish the basis for further learning, preventing school 
drop-out, increasing equity of outcomes and overall 
skill levels.” This statement is in conformity with the 
work of Heckman (2008), who emphasized the impor-
tance of early childhood investments with his famous 
Heckman Equation. Consequently, it is not only tax 
policies or social welfare systems that may account 
for intergenerational mobility, but basic modifications 
in the education systems and investments in the early 
development of cognitive and social skills of children. 
The quintessence of Heckman’s work can be subsumed 
by a statement on his webpage: “The highest rate of 
return in early childhood development comes from 
investing as early as possible, from birth through age 
five, in disadvantaged families. Starting at age three 
or four is too little too late, as it fails to recognize that 
skills beget skills in a complimentary and dynamic way. 
Efforts should focus on the first years for the greatest 
efficiency and effectiveness. The best investment is in 
quality early childhood development from birth to five 
for disadvantaged children and their families.”
Figure 4 finally gives an overview of parental 
determinants of children’s attainments. The socio-
economic background of parents sets the limits for 
investments into their children, be it in terms of quan-
tity or quality. Public intervention may substantially 
mitigate inequality developments by complementing 
private investments with public investments into off-
spring. For instance, public institutions could provide 
access to health care or pre-primary education. Such 
interventions should have a decisive impact on future 
earnings and the distribution of incomes. However, 
even with public interventions the equality of oppor-
tunity is no foregone conclusion, as Bourdieu (1987) 
emphasized. According to the French sociologist, there 
is still the behavioral pattern of the habitus that susta-
ins intergenerational persistence and that would have 
to be dismantled.
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A. Appendix
AT ES FR IE IT NO SE UK
Total observations 10,419 30,375 18,769 12,032 47,311 11,913 12,191 16,675
Labor Force 5,831 15,969 10,540 5,981 21,989 7,523 7,183 9,500
thereof:
Self-employed 658 2,608 833 1,056 5,348 648 737 1,183
Employees 5,173 13,361 9,707 4,925 16,641 6,875 6,446 8,317
thereof:
Fulltime workers 3,546 9,065 6,462 3,257 12,247 5,010 4,360 5,691
Missing wage or work time 167 1,133 330 190 1,065 165 148 3,089
Missing parental variable 584 1,225 774 1,346 1,268 2,622 2,298 555
results in:
Available sample 2,795 7,856 5,358 1,703 11,269 2,223 1,914 2,047
Weighted sample (in 1,000s) 1,854 9,985 13,453 493 12,235 725 1,327 5,606
Table A.1: Sample reduction by homogenization of population
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations.
AT ES FR IE IT NO SE UK
Individual attributes:
Sex (m=1; f=2) 1.313 1.351 1.400 1.418 1.347 1.393 1.386 1.434
(0.464) (0.477) (0.490) (0.493) (0.476) (0.488) (0.487) (0.496)
Age 41.71 40.56 42.07 41.49 41.54 43.25 43.68 42.26
(9.094) (9.646) (9.541) (10.20) (9.310) (10.52) (11.04) (10.42)
Income variables:
Hourly gross wages 15.00 9.376 13.24 19.31 11.95 20.73 15.09 17.90
(8.048) (6.093) (6.532) (15.35) (6.494) (8.707) (6.974) (17.98)
…for persons aged 30-45 14.63 9.29 12.89 19.63 11.38 20.63 14.88 18.35
(7.958) (6.158) (5.967) (19.20) (5.034) (8.972) (7.082) (12.00)
Hours worked weekly 41.03 41.85 40.10 40.64 40.68 39.75 40.94 40.55
(5.002) (6.605) (7.673) (7.097) (5.795) (5.436) (4.427) (7.613)
Parental variables:
Parental Fin. Situation 3.138 3.722 3.559 3.821 2.932 4.210 4.127 3.596
(1=worst; 5=best) (0.934) (1.343) (1.300) (1.239) (1.272) (1.013) (1.170) (1.321)
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of VOI for selected countries
Mean values; Standard deviation in parentheses
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations. Results are based on frequency weights.
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(1) Austria (2) Spain (3) France (4) Ireland (5) Italy (6) Norway (7) Sweden (8) UK
Age 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.009*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.210*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.126*** -0.182*** -0.201*** -0.184***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.032) (0.011) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024)
PID2 0.068 0.064** 0.014 -0.131* 0.088*** 0.005 0.008 -0.002
(0.055) (0.028) (0.033) (0.076) (0.018) (0.125) (0.065) (0.056)
PID3 0.122** 0.108*** 0.118*** -0.026 0.188*** 0.015 0.004 0.096**
(0.051) (0.025) (0.032) (0.062) (0.017) (0.118) (0.058) (0.047)
PID4 0.251*** 0.149*** 0.119*** 0.078 0.228*** 0.047 0.074 0.060
(0.053) (0.025) (0.032) (0.064) (0.019) (0.117) (0.052) (0.050)
PID5 0.364*** 0.250*** 0.181*** 0.116* 0.280*** 0.064 0.085* 0.153***
(0.063) (0.023) (0.031) (0.060) (0.020) (0.117) (0.050) (0.046)
Constant 2.119*** 1.539*** 2.008*** 2.507*** 1.718*** 2.704*** 2.239*** 2.808***
(0.068) (0.036) (0.041) (0.091) (0.031) (0.127) (0.074) (0.073)
Observations 2,795 7,856 5,358 1,703 11,269 2,223 1,914 2,047
R2 0.072 0.080 0.065 0.050 0.136 0.055 0.063 0.039
Table A.3: Regression Results for selected countries
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations. Coefficients are based on frequency weights.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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